BACKGROUND
The patents at issue disclose ''diagnostic test [s] which can be used to determine whether an individual . is at a lower risk or higher risk of devel-oping or having cardiovascular disease.'' These diagnostic tests are ''based on the discovery that patients with coronary artery disease (CAD) have significantly greater levels of leukocyte and blood myeloperoxidase (MPO) levels.'' At the time of the invention, cardiovascular disease (''CVD'') was understood to be multifactorial, and scientists and physicians were developing predictive algorithms based on genetic, environmental, and lifestyle factors. However, these factors alone did not fully predict an individual's risk of developing CVD; in particular, ''a large number of cardiovascular disorders occur [red] in individuals with apparently low to moderate risk profiles.'' Thus, the patents disclose a need in the art for ' '[d] iagnostic tests which employ risk factors that are independent of traditional CVD risk factors such as LDL levels.'' Myeloperoxidase (''MPO'') is a naturally-occurring heme protein associated with some types of white Christopher M. Holman is the Executive Editor of Biotechnology Law Report and a Professor at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. *The synopsis is original content and the decision itself has been condensed for ease of readability. blood cells. It functions as an oxidant, converting inert substrates to reactive oxygen species toxic to pathogens, to aid in phagocytosis, an important process in the body's immune system. Atherosclerosis (the major cause of coronary artery disease) was known to be ''a chronic inflammatory disorder,'' and high blood levels of other metabolites had been correlated to CVD. But these metabolites are imperfect markers of CVD because they are not specific to cardiovascular inflammation. While MPO had been found to be present at elevated levels in atherosclerotic lesions, it had not been shown that MPO was present at elevated levels in blood samples from patients with atherosclerotic CVD.
The patents disclose several methods of measuring a patient's blood MPO level. As is relevant to the claims, the patents disclose use of an enzymelinked immunosorbent assay (''ELISA''), a wellknown technique that quantifies the level of an antigen in a bodily sample by detecting its binding to a biochemically compatible antibody.
Example 1 discloses the results of a study of 326 patients and concludes that blood MPO levels strongly correlate with risk of coronary artery disease but not with traditional risk factors for coronary artery disease. In the study, MPO mass was quantified with ELISA, specifically by using a commercially-available antibody modified to bind to MPO. Examples 3-6 disclose experimental results, using other methods, showing that common oxidation products of MPO were present in significantly higher levels in blood samples from patients with coronary artery disease as compared to a control group.
We previously addressed the subject matter eligibility of a parent patent, U.S. Patent 7,223,552, in Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017 , cert. denied, ---U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 2621 (2018) (''Cleveland Clinic I''). Claim 11 of the '552 patent was exemplary: 11. A method of assessing a test subject's risk of having atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, comprising comparing levels of myeloperoxidase in a bodily sample from the test subject with levels of myeloperoxidase in comparable bodily samples from control subjects diagnosed as not having the disease, said bodily sample being blood, serum, plasma, blood leukocytes selected from the group consisting of neutrophils, monocytes, sub-populations of neutrophils, and sub-populations of monocytes, or any combination thereo[f];
wherein the levels of myeloperoxidase in the bodily [samples] from the test subject relative to the levels of [m]yeloperoxidase in the comparable bodily samples from control subjects is indicative of the extent of the test subject's risk.
In Cleveland Clinic I, we held these methods invalid under x 101 as directed to the ineligible natural law that blood MPO levels correlate with atherosclerotic CVD. We further held that, because the patent did not purport to have invented any of the biological techniques used to detect MPO or the statistical methods used to compare a patient's MPO levels to the control group, the claims recited no further inventive concept sufficient to transform the nature of the claims into a patent-eligible application of the natural law.
Meanwhile, Cleveland Clinic was issued the patents in suit from continuation applications ultimately claiming priority from the '552 patent. Claim 1 of the '597 patent is illustrative: 
DISCUSSION
Section 101 provides that ''[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.'' 35 U.S.C. x 101. But the Supreme Court has long interpreted these categories as excluding ''laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.' ' Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) .
Patent eligibility under x 101 is a question of law that can include subsidiary questions of fact. Such factual issues may be resolved on the pleadings ''based on the sources properly considered on a motion to dismiss, such as the complaint, the patent, and materials subject to judicial notice.'' Cleveland Clinic argues that the claims are not directed to a natural law, but to the technique of using an immunoassay to measure the blood MPO levels of patients with atherosclerotic CVD. Cleveland Clinic further asserts that, in any case, the correlation between blood MPO levels and atherosclerotic CVD is not a natural law because it can only be detected using certain techniques. According to Cleveland Clinic, prior art techniques were either too invasive (e.g., detecting MPO in samples of excised atherosclerotic lesions) or failed to predict CVD risk (e.g., a flow cytometry-based method called MPXI and an older technique for measuring MPO in white blood cells by staining). Cleveland Clinic also argues that, while performing an immunoassay on blood samples was known, using the immunoassay to detect the correlation between blood MPO levels and atherosclerotic CVD supplies an inventive concept sufficient to transform the claims into patent-eligible subject matter.
True Health responds that the correlation between atherosclerotic CVD and blood MPO levels is a natural law because it exists in nature apart from human intervention, regardless of the technique used to observe it. True Health further argues that using known techniques in a standard way to observe the natural law neither renders the claims directed to something other than this natural law nor supplies an additional inventive concept.
We agree with True Health and conclude, as we did in Cleveland Clinic I, that the claims are directed to the natural law that blood MPO levels correlate with atherosclerotic CVD. Cleveland Clinic's primary argument to the contrary is that, unlike the '552 patent claims, the claims at issue are not directed to ''assessing a test subject's risk of having atherosclerotic [CVD]'' by comparing the subject's MPO levels to a control group, '552 patent col. 30 ll. 47-62, but rather to ''techniques for detecting elevated levels of MPO in the blood of patients having CVD.''
We find, however, as the district court did, that this distinction is ''overly superficial.'' The claims are not directed to new techniques for performing an immunoassay to detect a patient's blood MPO levels. They only recite applying known methods to detect MPO levels in plasma, comparing them to standard MPO levels, and reaching a conclusion: that the patient's blood MPO levels are elevated in comparison to a control group. This conclusion is simply another articulation of the natural law that blood MPO levels correlate with atherosclerotic CVD. Thus, as we held in Cleveland Clinic I, the claims are directed to the patent-ineligible natural law that blood MPO levels correlate with risk of atherosclerotic CVD. The rephrasing of the claims does not make them less directed to a natural law.
Furthermore, the claims contain no additional inventive concept. Cleveland Clinic's argument to the contrary-that using a known technique in a standard way to observe a natural law can confer an inventive concept-has been consistently rejected by this court in circumstances nearly identical to this case. Athena, 915 F.3d at 753-54 (holding that there is no inventive concept in ''applying standard techniques in a standard way to observe a natural law''); see also Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1377 (''For process claims that encompass natural phenomenon, the process steps are the additional features that must be new and useful.'').
Neither the specification nor the record discloses any technical impediment to using an immunoassay in a standard way to measure MPO levels in blood. The patents disclose that an immunoassay was a known technique for measuring protein mass and never suggest that any significant adjustments needed to be made to accommodate its use for measuring blood MPO levels. Furthermore, the specification and prosecution history plainly concede that each of the process steps was wellknown in the art.
Cleveland Clinic also argues that remand is warranted because the district court improperly resolved factual disputes against it at the pleadings stage. In view of our conclusion that the specification and prosecution history are clear that the claimed method uses a known technique in a standard way to observe a natural law, we decline to do so. There is no reason to task the district court with finding an inventive concept that the specification and prosecution history concede does not exist.
Finally, Cleveland Clinic argues that the district court failed to give the appropriate deference to subject matter eligibility guidance published by the PTO 1 , as required by Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) . Skidmore ''requires courts to give some deference to informal agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory dictates, with the degree of deference depending on the circumstances.'' These circumstances include ''the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, [and] the persuasiveness of the agency's position.'' Cleveland Clinic further contends that the district court erred by not granting Skidmore deference to the examiner's decision to allow the patents' applications to issue in light of the guidance, specifically Example 29-Claim 1.
Example 29 sets forth a hypothetical protein, ''JUL-1,'' which naturally occurs in people with an autoimmune disease, ''julitis,'' but not in others. The applicant discloses ''routine and conventional'' techniques, including an immunoassay and spectroscopy, to detect the presence of the protein in a patient's plasma sample. The example claim is reproduced below:
1. A method of detecting JUL-1 in a patient, said method comprising: a. obtaining a plasma sample from a human patient; and b. detecting whether JUL-1 is present in the plasma sample by contacting the plasma sample with an anti-JUL-1 antibody and detecting binding between JUL-1 and the antibody.
In its guidance, the PTO advised that, because the claim does not ''recite or describe any [ineligible concept],'' it is not directed to a natural law and is eligible under x 101.
We agree with True Health that the district court did not err in finding the instant claims ineligible. While we greatly respect the PTO's expertise on all matters relating to patentability, including patent eligibility, we are not bound by its guidance. And, especially regarding the issue of patent eligibility and the efforts of the courts to determine the distinction between claims directed to natural laws and those directed to patent-eligible applications of those laws, we are mindful of the need for consistent application of our case law.
Example 29-Claim 1 is strikingly similar to claim 1 of U.S. Patent 6,258,540 at issue in Ariosa:
1. A method for detecting a paternally inherited nucleic acid of fetal origin performed on a maternal serum or plasma sample from a pregnant female, which method comprises amplifying a paternally inherited nucleic acid from the serum or plasma sample and detecting the presence of a paternally inherited nucleic acid of fetal origin in the sample.
In Ariosa, we held this claim ineligible because it was directed to the discovery that paternally inherited cffDNA exists in maternal blood plasma and the amplification and detection techniques were concededly known in the art. Likewise, Example 29 stipulates that the techniques used to detect JUL-1 were conventionally applied to detect any protein of interest. The only remaining nonconventional element of each claim is the discovery that the protein is present in the bodily sample, and the discovery of a natural law cannot by itself provide the requisite inventive concept.
We have considered Example 29 and the arguments relating to it, but to the extent that Example 29-Claim 1 is analogous to the claims at issue, Ariosa must control. Accordingly, we decline to follow the PTO's Example 29-Claim 1 and conclude that the district court did not err in its consideration of the PTO's subject matter eligibility guidance.
Finally, to the extent Cleveland Clinic argues that the district court should have deferred to the examiner's decision to allow the asserted claims, we have consistently held that any such deference is incorpo-rated into the presumption of patent validity under 35 U.S.C. x 282, see Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 719 F.3d 1346 , 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013 , which the district court recognized. AFFIRMED 176 Biotechnology Law Report Volume 38, Number 3
